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Abstract 
In labour economics theory, wage negotiations use to rely on a Symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution. The aim of this 
study is to show that this kind of solution may be not relevant. Indeed, in a matching model framework, the 
comparison with the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution suggests that a reflection should systematically be made with respect 
to the negotiation power of each agent (a same ascertainment has been pointed out by McDonald and Solow (1981)). 
Finally, we characterize the Kalai-Smorodinsky in the job matching setting.
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     1. Introduction
The search and matching model is the corner stone for the analysis of labour
market. The job matching theory originating with Mortensen and Pissarides
into the tradition of unemployment theory provides a benchmark model in
labour economics. In fact, the equilibrium search and matching literature,
coming from Diamond (1971) and (1982), Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides
(2000), has branched out into diﬀerent research programs. The equilibrium
theory of unemployment is probably the best known for the analysis of labour
markets.
In numerous papers dealing with the matching models, the Symmetric Nash
Bargaining solution is usually applied. However, this kind of solution could
not be appropriated in some cases and leads to move away from the labour
market reality. Consequently, it could skew the analysis and the policy deci-
sions. Experiments due to Siegal and Fouraker (1960), Nydegger and Owen
(1974) also suggest that the Nash solution is an unreasonable model of pair-
wise negotiations. The reason why is that players make interpersonal compar-
ison of utility gains such as would be the case with for example the equal-gain
model of Myerson (1977) but can not occur with the Nash solution because
of the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom.
Other solutions exist to solve bargaining problems: among them the Kalai-
Smoro-dinsky solution (KS, thereafter) (Kalai-Smorodinsky 1975) or even
the Equal-loss solution (Chun 1988). According to the selected solution,
the interpretation (and thus some eﬀects of public policies) can diﬀer. Few
authors applied the KS-solution to the labour market analysis. Gerber and
Upmann (2006) analyze a classic bargaining problem between a labour union
and an employers’ federation through the Nash and KS solutions. Notably,
they point out the eﬀect of the reservation wage on the employment and
on the wage determination. Indeed they conclude that a higher reservation
wage leads to a lower employment level with the Nash Solution, whereas the
KS-solution leads up to an ambiguity. Laroque and Salanié (2004) stress the
eﬀect of the minimum wage on the employment in the case of wage bargaining
between ﬁrms and workers. They show that the KS solution does better than
the Nash solution.
This paper aims at developing this kind of analysis applied to the match-
ing issue. Actually, in a matching model, we show that the eﬀects of public
policy can be diﬀerent according to the solution we take into considera-
tion. Then, the comparison between the "usual" Nash solution and the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution suggests that a reﬂection should systematically
1be made about the choice of the solution applied (and, in particular, about
the value of the negotiation power of each agent).
The rest of paper is organized as follows. The model and comparison of
the bargaining solutions are presented in Section 2. Then, the quantitative
analysis results are discussed in Section 3. Finally section 4 concludes the
paper.
2. The Model
Using a matching model with standard hypothesis (Pissarides 2000), we
consider an economy composed of a large exogenous number of workers and
a large endogenous number of ﬁrms. Firms are supposed to be identical
and oﬀer a single job. The hypothesis of ﬁrm free-entry enables to maintain
a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms at the steady state. Agents are risk neutral and
discount the future with the same rate of time preference denoted by r. The
exogenous job destruction rate is s.
Frictions are present in the labour market which means that it takes time
for ﬁrms with a vacant job to ﬁnd a worker. Such frictions are represented
by a constant-returns matching function m(V;U), where U is the number of
employable unemployed workers and V is the number of vacant jobs. This
matching function (Pissarides 2000) is an homogenous function of degree
1, increasing in V and U. Instantaneous matching depends on the market
tightness, noted µ = V=U. The probability for a ﬁrm to meet an employable







) = q(µ) (1)
This probability is a decreasing function of µ. A rise in the number of vacan-
cies leads to a negative impact on the rate to ﬁll a job due to the congestion
eﬀect.




= µq(µ) = p(µ) (2)
This hiring probability is increasing in µ. Indeed, a rise of vacancies implies
more opportunities for workers to ﬁnd a job.
22.1 Expected lifetime Utilities and Proﬁts
According to the usual Belmann’s equations, the expected utility of an
employed worker, denoted U1, depends on his current wage w and on the
probability that he become unemployed (under the destruction rate s).
rU1(w;µ) = w ¡ s(U1 ¡ d1) (3)
With respect to unemployed worker, his expected utility, noted d1, depends
on his current income and on the probability that he gets employed (under
the hiring probability p(µ)). We suppose that this income is only composed
of unemployed beneﬁts b.
rd1(w;µ) = b + p(U1 ¡ d1) (4)
Diﬀerentiating the worker utility with respect to w and µ (holding the level












(r + p(µ))(r + p(µ) + s)
< 0 (5)
The expected utility (proﬁt) of ﬁrms depends on the probability that the job
gets ﬁlled.
Concerning a ﬁlled job, the expected proﬁt is composed of the net instanta-
neous income (y ¡ w) and the future proﬁt with respect to the destruction
rate s.
rU2(w;µ) = y ¡ w ¡ s(U2 ¡ d2) (6)
In regard to a vacant job, as long as this job is unﬁlled, ﬁrms have to invest
c corresponding to the job creation and the search of a worker. Firms can
expect to ﬁll the job (and reach the corresponding expected proﬁt) with a
probability q(µ). The expected value for a vacant job d2 is then given by:
rd2(w;µ) = ¡c + q(µ)(U2 ¡ d2) (7)
The free-entry hypothesis implies that new jobs are created until the optimal
value of a vacant job be equal to zero.
Diﬀerentiating ﬁrm’s proﬁt with respect to w and µ (holding the level of U2










µs(y ¡ w + c)
(r + q(µ))(r + q(µ) + s)
< 0 (8)
The Pareto-curve is deﬁned as the set of all pair (w, µ) such that U(w;µ)
is Pareto eﬃcient. Hence, it is the set of all (w, µ) for which worker’s and



















(r + p(µ))(r + p(µ) + s)
=
q0
µs(y ¡ w + c)
(r + q(µ))(r + q(µ) + s)
(9)
The diﬀerentiation with respect to µ and w points out that the wage w is
decreasing with µ along the Pareto curve (@w=@µ < 0).
2.2 Wage Bargaining and Surplus Sharing
Before determining the bargaining solutions, we have to present the ax-
ioms which will be used to characterize these solutions. We denote by S the
set of the payoﬀs in the bargaining set, u1 and u2 the utility function for each
agent, d the disagreement point (d1 for agent 1 and d2 for the second) and u¤
1,
u¤
2 the solutions. The set S is compact and convex. The solution is an applica-
tion Á which combines a payoﬀ vector Á(S;d) = (Á1(S;d);Á2(S;d)) = (u¤
1;u¤
2)
with each bargaining problem (S,d).
² (A1) Individual rationality (IR): u¤
1 ¸ d1 and u¤
2 ¸ d2, i.e. Á(S;d) ¸ d.
² (A2) Pareto optimality (PO): For u¤ 2 S and 8^ u 2 S, if ^ u ¸ u¤, then
^ u = u¤.
² (A3) Symmetry (SYM): If d1 = d2 and if f(u;v) : (v;u) 2 Sg = S,
then u¤ = v¤ if (S,d) is symmetric.
² (A4) Invariance with respect to linear utility transformations (ILUT):
If T is obtained from S by a linear transformation, then the solution
(u¤
1;u¤
2) will be transformed by the same function. If T = f(®1u1 +
¯1;®2u2 + ¯2) : (u1;u2) 2 Sg and h = (®1d1 + ¯1;®2d2 + ¯2), then
Á(T;h) = (®1Á1(S;d) + ¯1;®2Á2(S;d) + ¯2).
4² (A5) Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA): For all closed and
convex set T ½ S, if Á(S;d) 2 T, then Á(T;d) = Á(S;d).
The optimization program is given by:
max
p
(U1 ¡ d1)(U2 ¡ d2) (10)
The diﬀerence between the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions con-
cerns the ﬁfth axiom: the Independence of irrelevant alternatives. This one
is replaced by the monotonicity axiom.
² (A50) Individual monotonicity (IM): considering two sets S and T with
S µ T and the disagreement point of the two sets d, if (u¤
1;u¤
2) is the
solution of (S;d) and if (u0¤
1 ;u0¤






Replacing IIA by this monotonicity axiom allows players to make interper-
sonal comparison of utility gains and hence more in accord with the literature
on the job matching.
Theorem 1 (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975). The Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution is the unique solution that satisﬁes IR, PO, SYM, ILUT and
IM. The KS curve is given by the function ÁKS :
Á
KS = (U2 ¡ d2)(U
max
1 ¡ d1) ¡ (U
max
2 ¡ d2)(U1 ¡ d1) = 0
KS enables to deﬁne the ideal point I corresponding to the maximum payoﬀ
(Umax
1 , Umax
2 ) for each agent. However, this ideal point is not feasible. The
negotiation process leads to a solution which goes away the least from this
point. So KS have shown that if the bargaining set is compact and convex and
if there is at least one point in the bargaining set which is strictly individually
rational for both players, these axioms are satisﬁed by a unique point on its
boundary.
2.2.1 The Nash solution
In accordance with usual matching models, surplus created by a ﬁrm/worker
is divided between the two agents according to their respective bargaining







Therefore, the global surplus, noted S, is divided between the two agents
according to the Nash rule:
Nash :
½
U1 ¡ d1 = ¯(U1 ¡ d1 + U2 ¡ d2) = ¯S




r + s + p(µ)
= ¯
y ¡ w + c
r + s + q(µ)
()
w ¡ b
r + s + p(µ)
y ¡ w + c





By diﬀerentiating this expression with respect to µ and w, we deduce that
the wage w is increasing with µ, along the Nash curve.
2.2.2 The KS solution
In this section we characterize the ks solution for our framework. The




1 ) ¡ (Umax
2 ¡ Umin
2 )(U1 ¡ Umin




y ¡ w + c
r + s + q(µ)
¶Ã
^ w ¡ b




y ¡ ~ w + c
r + s + q(~ µ)
¶µ
w ¡ b




As for the Nash curve, the KS curve gives an increasing relation between the
wage and the market tightness. The intersection with the Pareto curve leads
to the following solution:
^ w ¡ b
r + s + p(^ µ)
y ¡ ~ w + c








Each worker and each ﬁrm has a maximal payoﬀ represented by an ideal
point I. Concerning the ﬁrm, his ideal is to have a maximum proﬁt resulting
from a minimum wage ~ w payed to each worker (i.e. a wage equal to the
unemployment beneﬁts b, ~ w = b). The ideal wage ^ w for the worker is equal
6to his productivity ( ^ w = y). In this case, the probability for a worker to ﬁnd
a job p(^ µ) and the probability for a ﬁrm to recruit a worker q(~ µ) are supposed
maximal (p(^ µ) = 1 and q(~ µ) = 1).








r + s + p(µ)
y ¡ w + c
r + s + q(µ)
, which leads to
an other expression for the KS solution. It enables us to compare with the
Nash solution.
y ¡ b
y ¡ b + c
=
w ¡ b
r + s + p(µ)
y ¡ w + c
r + s + q(µ)
(14)
2.2.3 Comparison of the bargaining solutions
The Nash and KS curves are increasing. For a ﬁxed µ, we can determine
the wage according to the two bargaining solutions :
We denote by ª(µ) =
r + s + q(µ)
r + s + p(µ)
.
wN =











y + c + bª(µ)
µ





y ¡ b + c
y ¡ b
¶ (16)
The wage resulting from the Nash solution is higher than the one from the
KS solution under a condition:
wN > wKS if





The ﬁgure 1 gives the position of the curves according to this two solutions.
Thus, we deduce that the Nash solution is preferable for workers.
7Figure 1: Nash and Kalai Smorodinsky Solutions
Proposition 1. In the literature, the symmetric Nash solution, in which the
negotiation power between the ﬁrm and the worker is equal, is usually applied.
However, the KS solution points out that this hypothesis is not relevant if the
cost of a vacant job is positive. Beside, the KS solution would enable to
determinate the “ real ” negotiation power of each agent. This power is then
stronger for the ﬁrm to the detriment of the worker.
Proof. Considering the Nash solution, the negotiation power is given by (1¡
¯)=¯. In the literature, the value of ¯ is equal to “ 1=2 ”, resulting in an equal
negotiation power between the two agents. The KS bargaining solution leads
to (y ¡b+c)=(y ¡b). It is obvious that the negotiation power is unequal for
a positive vacant job cost. By comparing these two expressions, we conclude
that the value “ 1=2 ” is not appropriated and it brings an imbalance in
the power struggle between the workers and the ﬁrms. Moreover, the two
solutions coincide if ¯ = y ¡ b and 1 ¡ ¯ = y ¡ b + c.
3. Quantitative analysis
Now it would be interesting to pursue this analysis by focusing on the
eﬀects of the various variables on the equilibrium values. To this purpose,
we use the following calibration. The matching function is represented by
a Cobb-Douglas function: M(V;U) = V 1=2U1=2, which gives q(µ) = µ1=2.
We retain the following standard parameters values : ¯ = 0:5;c = 0:3;r =
0:05;s = 0:15;y = 1.
8b c r s y
wN ++ - - - +
wKS + - - - - - - ++
Table 1: Impacts on the wage according to the bargaining solutions
Proposition 2. Through the calibration of this model, we obtain that the
parameters have the same impacts on the equilibrium wage, whatever the
solution chosen. However, the variation of Kalai on the wage is stronger
than in the Nash solution, except for unemployment beneﬁts.
4. Final remarks
Considering the choice of the bargaining solution as a secondary issue,
most of the literature about matching models (among others) generally re-
tains the Nash solution, without justifying this choice, and discussing its
relevance (maybe because the mathematics involved are little more compli-
cated than for the nash solution). However, other solutions can actually be
applied, not without consequences. Indeed, by using the KS solution (we do
believe that this solution is better if we consider negotiation process between
a worker and a ﬁrm in the labour market) in a matching model, we show
that the equilibrium as well as some eﬀects of public policies (for example
about unemployment beneﬁts) are diﬀerent. Without reconsidering the va-
lidity of works using the Nash solution, we conclude that the choice of the
solution may actually be decisive and should therefore be subject to further
and systematic analysis.
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